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FUGITIVE ON THE RUN
Rudolph J.R. Peritz*
HANK you for the opportunity to report on a pressing matter. I
ask for your discretion in distributing this correspondence. No
one in Washington, D.C., or in Chicago has sent me. Nor does
anyone in the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department or at the Uni-
versity of Chicago even know I am here, though I am certain they would
agree with my mission. It is not secret. But for reasons that will become
clear, I hope you will keep it confidential.
I am in Brussels to learn the whereabouts of a fugitive from Justice
and, if successful, to begin extradition proceedings. While the fugitive
goes by the misleading name of "Competition Policy" around the world,
in the United States, he is known as "Antitrust." Unless repatriated and
restrained, Antitrust will continue to commit offenses against consumer
welfare. With the help of the University of Chicago's efficiency police,
we have tracked him for forty years, doctrine by doctrine across five con-
tinents. Still, despite our best efforts, Antitrust appears to raise havoc
from time to time. His illogic has been most evidently successful in per-
suading the European Commission to support an essential facilities doc-
trine that has long been discredited in the United States, most recently by
our Justice Antonin Scalia.1 So don't be deceived. Reports of his death
have been greatly exaggerated in America, especially after he reportedly
gave up the ghost in the United States v. Microsoft litigation.2
But Antitrust is alive and well, living the life of an expatriot in Europe.
There have been numerous sightings in Brussels, most notoriously in and
around the European Commission's ongoing Microsoft activities. 3 More-
over, in countries around the world, Antitrust is known to corrupt the
minds of policy makers, judges, and scholars. A few years ago, for exam-
ple, he did just that in Singapore, with the help of English, German, Aus-
* Professor of Law and Director, IProgress Project, New York Law School. An ear-
lier version of this paper was presented at RETHINKING THE ROOTS OF ANTITRUST: EU
AND US, March 13, 2008, Osservatorio di ProprietA intellettuale Concorrenza e Comunica-
zioni, LUISS University, Rome, Italy (on file with author).
1. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,410-
11 (2004).
2. See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
3. See generally Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-03601.
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tralian, and even an American collaborator. 4 Antitrust is nonetheless a
fugitive from the Chicago Asylum for Neo-Classical Economics. 5 Con-
sider him delusional and dangerous. Make no mistake about our inten-
tions. We want him back. He uses several disguises, often that of
Thurman Arnold, whom Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed the first chief
of the new Antitrust Division of the Justice Department.
6
Once you understand how dangerously destabilizing Antitrust can be,
you will want to help us in restraining his offenses against consumer wel-
fare. I will tell you about his tragic life-not all of it, just his unnatural
birth and the early signs of an unrelenting bipolar disorder. Then I will
describe our program of econo-shock therapy that has cleansed Antitrust
in America of distributive and political delusions, and re-oriented policy
to serve the interests of consumers by applying the neutral principle of
wealth maximization. In the long course of this treatment, we came upon
a startling realization-there was no true bipolar disorder but only the
singular delusion that wealth maximization is an inadequate grundnorm,
as Hans Kelsen might have put it.7 The public policy implication of my
report is that you must always remain vigilant because there is the con-
stant danger that a delusional Antitrust will return to destabilize Ameri-
can political economy despite the Chicago School's best neo-classical
logic of price theory and its powerful prescription of wealth
maximization. 8
And so, I begin this sad history: To understand Antitrust's underlying
econo-pathology, we must return to the historical circumstances of his
unnatural birth in 1890, including the congressional gestation period that
preceded it.9 Like the 1990s, the 1890s were a time of dramatic industrial
transformation in the United States.10 In the 1890s, the drama's leading
character was John D. Rockefeller, whose Standard Oil Company be-
sieged both railroads and competitors. He was not unlike Bill Gates,
whose Microsoft Corporation stalked the Internet and middleware rivals,
a century later.11 Both periods saw increasing industrial concentration,
though in the 1890s the trend was more widespread: While some indus-
4. Burton Ong, The Competition Act 2004: A Legislative Landmark on Singapore's
Legal Landscape, 2006 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 172.
5. See RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: HISTORY, RHETO-
RIc, LAW 258-62 (rev. ed. 2000).
6. See SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMAN ARNOLD: A BIOGRAPHY 178 (2005).
This appointment is of historical interest insofar as it reflects the New Deal commitment to
strong antitrust policy in the midst of the country's Great Depression. See PERITZ, supra
note 5, at 111.
7. HANS KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW 8-10 (Max Knight trans., 2d ed.,
Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2005) (1934).
8. See PERrTZ, supra note 5, at 258-62.
9. See generally PERITZ, supra note 5, at 9, 20. What follows in this essay can be
understood as a caricatured, very short-hand rendition of description and analysis appear-
ing throughout the book.
10. See Rudolph J.R. Peritz, The Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1980 in HISTORIANS ON
AMERICA: DECISIONS THAT MADE A DIFFERENCE 31, 31-32 (U.S. Department of Justice
2007), available at www.america.gov/media/pdflbooks/historians-on-america.pdf#popup.
11. PERITZ, supra note 5, at 305.
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tries consolidated through merger, many more organized themselves into
cartels or looser, industry-wide arrangements. 12 At the same time, labor
unions were growing and some Americans were concerned that industrial
relations between cartelized management and organized labor would lead
to class warfare that was seen as un-American. 13 Class struggle was
viewed as a European politics of Socialism, if not Communism, even
though labor strikes had already led to brutal violence across America. 14
When Congress convened to consider these matters, they declared that
the citizenry, especially the "small dealers and worthy men" they saw to
be the very backbone of the country, were being oppressed by the
Trusts. 15 Trust was a technical term for what would today be called a
holding company, but came to mean any large accumulation of economic
and political power, including large firms and cartels. 16 As a long reces-
sion persisted, virtually every product market, from patent medicines to
matchbooks to crepe paper, was administered by a dominant firm, cartel,
or industry-wide agreement. 17 In this light, trust and monopoly came to
be synonymous terms for the industrial concentration that was seen as the
consequence of ruinous competition. 18
Congress gave birth to the Antitrust Act in 1890.19 The preceding con-
gressional debates showed signs that the birth would be difficult because
Congress was of two minds. Some legislators were concerned about "ru-
inous competition," about economic concentration as the result, and
about the impact on the entrepreneurial freedom and individual liberty of
most citizens, as well as higher prices to consumers. 20 Others, however,
believed that legislation should not, and, ultimately, could not stop the
tumultuous economic changes that were going on; they believed Congress
should not interfere with freedom of contract and, in any event, could not
stop the natural evolution of business enterprise in competitive
markets.21
Both factions in Congress argued for free competition; but each had in
mind a very different notion of freedom. One faction took free competi-
tion to mean freedom from private economic power-from the trusts,
whether dominant firms or cartels. The other faction took free competi-
tion to mean freedom from government oppression-from political impo-
sitions on freedom of contract. These two visions of free competition
would conflict every time government acted to curb economic power. 22
And so, Antitrust was born with a bipolar disorder of free competition.
12. See id. at 11.
13. Id. at 33, 97.
14. Id. at 97
15. Id. at 15.
16. Id. at 11.
17. Id. at 53, 136.
18. Id. at 11.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 14-15.
21. Id. at 15-16.
22. Id. at 27.
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In consequence, Antitrust would live an unbalanced public policy life of
periods of calm interrupted by acute econo-pathological outbreaks of free
competition. Sometimes, the pressures of private economic power would
prove too much and an episode of intense government intervention
would erupt. At other times, the impress of government oversight would
provoke a laissez-faire interval of anti-interventionist zeal.
These extreme interludes of free competition were symptoms of the
tension between deep-rooted progressive and conservative ideologies.
The job of moderating Antitrust's extreme tendencies fell largely on the
federal courts, though Congress would legislate from time to time.
Until the first Supreme Court decision in 1897, federal judges were en-
thralled by the conservative strain of free competition.23 Although the
jurisprudence was a moderate-sounding rule of reason, the practice was
anything but moderate: The lower courts consistently approved of cartels
and trusts and so, despite the rhetoric of reason, the outcomes reflected
the laissez-faire extreme of free competition. 24 Then, the Supreme Court
in its 1897 Antitrust case produced a 5-4 decision whose deep division
was symptomatic of the bipolar tendencies of free competition.2 5 One
year later, a similarly bipolar decision followed.
26
In each case, five justices declared that a railroad price-fixing cartel was
illegal simply because its economic power allowed it to restrain free com-
petition, regardless of the particular commercial circumstances. 27 Free
competition meant competition free from private economic power.
Moreover, the Trans-Missouri majority insisted, such cartels threatened
to destroy the class of "small dealers and worthy men" that had long been
recognized as the backbone of political independence in the United
States.28 This progressive episode of free competition, so-called because
government was seen as capable of promoting progress, has been diag-
nosed as the cognitively debilitating syndrome of Jeffersonian en-
trepreneurialism-the illogical commitment to small business.
29
In the Trans-Missouri case, the four Justices in the minority faction,
three of whom also dissented in Joint-Traffic, insisted that the lower
courts had been right all along, that a rule of reason called for recognizing
that competition can sometimes be ruinous, and, thus, that freedom of
contract should be permitted to moderate the destructive extremes of
competition. 30 To the minority faction, free competition meant the busi-
23. See id. at 30; see also United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290,
328-29 (1897).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 58 F. 58, 71 (8th Cir. 1892)
(examining "uniformly approved," common-law rule of reason).
25. See Trans-Missouri Freight Assoc., 166 U.S. at 327-39.
26. See United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898). To be precise, they
were the first Sherman Act cases decided on the merits. The Court had earlier decided
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1895) on jurisdictional grounds.
27. Joint-Traffic, 171 U.S. at 577; Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 337.
28. Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 323-24.
29. See PERITZ, supra note 5, at 31.
30. Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 356, 358 (White, J., dissenting).
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nessman's ability to adjust to natural market forces free from government
intrusion. This conservative response, so-called because it called for con-
servation of private rights and the economic power they can produce, has
been diagnosed as the equally cognitively debilitating syndrome of lais-
sez-faire conservatism-the illogical commitment to markets as self-
regulating. 31
In 1904, an adolescent Antitrust suffered a deeply psychotic episode of
the bipolar disorder, one that split the Supreme Court's psyche into four
personalities, reflected in four separate opinions. 32 It was the Northern
Securities case, which involved a true trust that the legendary financier
J.P. Morgan had formed to end brutal competition between two national
railroads along 9,000 miles of parallel track. 33 Without going into the
particulars, let it be sufficient to say that a plurality of four justices saw
the merger as illegal per se from a progressive view of free competition, 34
while four justices, in two separate opinions, saw the merger. as entirely
reasonable from a conservative view, though for different reasons. 35 The
tie-breaking ninth judge gnashed his teeth and rent his clothing in a con-
curring opinion: Justice David J. Brewer began by agreeing with the dis-
senters' conservative view of free competition but concluded by siding
with the progressive plurality faction-not because he agreed with their
view of free competition, but because his own brand of conservatism
compelled him to respect Court precedent and thus preserve the existing
jurisprudence. 36 But after concurring with the progressives in this case,
Brewer closed his opinion by warning that he would join the conserva-
tives in future cases. 37 To make sure everyone believed him and perhaps
to clarify things for himself, he embarked on a public lecture tour to
speak on the fundamental importance of protecting private property and
freedom of contract.
By 1911, Supreme Court membership had changed and a new majority
emerged to adopt the rule of reason earlier espoused by the conservative
minority faction and by lower court judges before 1897.38 This was a
common-law rule of reason that applied the logic of classical economics, a
loosely deductive analysis that began with freedom of contract as the ma-
jor premise and concluded by inferring that more freedom of contract led
to more competition. 39 In this view, courts should step in only when con-
31. See PERITZ, supra note 5, at 30-31.
32. See generally N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
33. Id. at 320-22.
34. Id. at 327.
35. Id. at 410-11 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (asserting that "a partnership is not a contract
or combination in restraint of trade" and that the contracts and combinations proscribed
by the law "derive their character as restraining trade from other features than the sup-
pression of competition alone"); id. a 400 (White, J., dissenting) (finding that "Congress
was without power to regulate" the transaction at issue).
36. Id. at 360-61, 363 (Brewer, J., concurring).
37. See id. at 364.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); see also PERITZ, supra note 5, at 50.
39. PERITZ, supra note 5, at 59-60; see also Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 59-62.
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tracts unreasonably restrain trade.40 Unreasonable restraints were seen
in terms of an ill-defined cluster of "unnatural" practices.4 1 Nevertheless,
unlike the old lower court cases, the new Supreme Court majority's rule
of reason did not produce the same laissez-faire result.4 2 It was the very
model of moderation. As evidence that the rule of reason was not a code
for laissez-faire conservatism, the Court dissolved the Standard Oil Trust
into thirty-three separate companies after determining it had engaged in
unreasonable restraints of competition.43 Still, there was effective con-
servatism alive in the remedy: The thirty-three different companies were
owned by the same shareholders and run by the same operations manag-
ers who had owned and run the Standard Oil Trust.4 4 And so, they came
to be known as the Baby Standards. After public outrage, industry stud-
ies, and committee meetings in Congress, the Clayton and Federal Trade
Commission Acts of 1914 were passed in an effort to break through the
logjam of judicial conservatism. 45
By then, market economics was entering the picture, and from this neo-
classical perspective, a consensus was emerging that a fact-intensive
framework was needed for the rule of reason in place of the Standard Oil
opinion's loosely deductive approach derived from the common law of
trade restraints. In 1918, the Supreme Court adopted a new rule of rea-
son in an opinion authored by recently appointed Justice Louis Bran-
deis.4 6 Rather than common law reasoning about freedom of contract,
the new approach called for close factual examination of the economic
circumstances of particular cases.4 7 The unanimous Supreme Court opin-
ion in Chicago Board of Trade presented an exhaustive list of factors 4 8
which, in retrospect, was the first step toward the modern economic rule
of reason with its three elements of purpose, market power, and competi-
tive effects. The Court embarked on the long journey to an economic
cure for the bipolar disorder of free competition.
Three landmark decisions in the mid-twentieth century would highlight
the progress of Antitrust doctrine toward recovery under the new eco-
nomic cure.
First, in Socony Vacuum (1940), the Supreme Court declared an oil car-
tel illegal per se because it restrained the market's price mechanism,
which Justice William 0. Douglas identified as the economy's "central
nervous system."'4 9 Thus, economics formulated the therapy needed to
control Antitrust's bipolar episodes of progressive and conservative delu-
40. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 62.
41. Rudolph J. Peritz, The 'Rule of Reason' in Antitrust Law: Property Logic in Re-
straint of Competition, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 285, 332 (1989).
42. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. 45-46.
43. Id. at 45-46, 82.
44. PERITZ, supra note 5, at 64.
45. Id. at 64-65.
46. See generally Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
47. Id. at 238.
48. Id.
49. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. United States, 310 U.S. 150, 218, 224 (1940).
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sions: doctrinal prescriptions to assure the neurological vigor of the price
mechanism.
In 1945, the legendary Judge Learned Hand, in his ALCOA opinion,
presented, for the first time, a robust judicial analysis of relevant market
definition. 50 Still, the opinion took a treacherous turn: It invited a dan-
gerous re-awakening of Antitrust's early struggles with the progressive
impulse by acknowledging a Congressional preference for an unconcen-
trated industrial structure, even at the cost of higher prices.51 Thus, de-
spite the infusion of market analysis, the ALCOA opinion seemed to
revive the progressive strain in Antitrust's underlying bipolar disorder.
But subsequent decisions declined to follow that progressive impulse.
Most notably, the Court majority in DuPont (Cellophane) (1956), for the
first time, adopted a technical economic concept to determine the rele-
vant market; in this case, it was flexible packaging materials rather than
cellophane. 52 As a direct result, the monopolization case was dismissed
on account of lack of monopoly power in the broadly defined market.53
To evaluate competition between these differentiated products, the Court
applied the technical economic concept of cross-elasticity of demand to
determine the degree to which buyers viewed several varieties of flexible
packaging as substitutes for cellophane. 54 In particular, the concept calls
for calculating changes in demand for flexible packaging materials, pre-
sumably in response to changes in the price of cellophane.55 The result-
ing ratio of price to quantity changes is the cross-elasticity of demand.5 6
The price mechanism's central importance was maintained though a dis-
senting opinion called the "Cellophane Fallacy,"'57 which called the eco-
nomic analysis into question. 58 Indeed, influential modern adherents to
the Chicago-School cure doubt the therapeutic powers of the technical
economic concept.59 The signs were troubling.
In those same years, a new economic paradigm was gaining promi-
nence. It was Edward Chamberlin's oligopoly theory, which holds that
concentrated markets tend to be less competitive because they are natu-
rally organized to ease collusion and other non-competitive parallel con-
50. See generally United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
51. See id. at 428-29.
52. United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395-400 (1956).
53. Id. at 404.
54. Id. at 400.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., JOHN DuFFY, ECONoMics 27 (1993). The changes are measured by per-
centages. So for example a change from $1 to 99q is 1%.
57. See generally Gene C. Schaerr, The Cellophane Fallacy and the Justice Depart-
ment's Guidelines for Horizontal Mergers, 94 YALE L.J. 670 (1985).
58. DuPont, 351 U.S. 417-18 (Warren, J., dissenting).
59. See, e.g., RicHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES,
ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 358-360 (2d ed. 1981) (discussing reasons, in-
cluding the Cellophane Fallacy, why authors doubt that the "concept of cross-elasticity of
demand is a useful addition to antitrust analysis").
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duct.60 The theory seems to make intuitive sense simply because the
transaction costs of monitoring rivals' conduct decline as the number of
firms decreases. But the theory was also taken to answer deep political
concerns. Shortly after World War II, oligopoly theory began to attract
those who believed that imperialist Japan and the fascist regimes in Eu-
rope had been aided and abetted by large firms in concentrated mar-
kets.61 In the United States, both the economics and the politics of
oligopoly theory were expressed in Congressional deliberations that led,
in 1950, to an amendment strengthening the Clayton Act's merger provi-
sion,62 which was intended to stem a perceived tide of industrial concen-
tration.63 These beliefs also led American foreign policy makers involved
in the World War II recovery effort's Marshall Plan to urge European
leaders to include a competition policy in their blueprint for opening bor-
ders to create a single market and encourage political cooperation within
the new European Economic Community (EEC).64 Both the 1950 U.S.
merger legislation and the competition provisions in the EEC's founding
document, the Treaty of Rome,65 were as much politics as economics, and
in that sense, both embodied the bipolar tendencies of free competition
born in the 1890 Antitrust Act.
In the United States, Chamberlin's theory of oligopoly (as well as his
theory of monopolistic competition) did not replace its predecessors, but
supplemented classical political economy and neo-classical price theory in
the Antitrust psyche. 66 And so, a hoped-for economic cure for Anti-
trust's bipolar tendencies developed into a three-part invention, whose
interactions would produce varying effects in the patient. I do not have
time today to discuss the ongoing interplay among competing models of
antitrust economics. 67
What followed the post-war period was an extended episode of the
progressive side of free competition that persisted into the 1970s. Here
are a few examples:
In 1962, the Supreme Court opinion in Brown Shoe interpreted the
1950 merger amendment's congressional history as espousing "the desira-
bility of retaining 'local control' over industry and the protection of small
business. '68 Within five years, in further paroxysms of Jeffersonian en-
trepreneurialism, the Supreme Court gave special dispensation to a small
60. EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETI-
TION: A RE-ORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF VALUE 9, 50, 54 (8th ed. 1962); see also
PERITZ, supra note 5, at 107.
61. See PERITZ, supra note 5, at 178, 183.
62. Antimerger Act of December 29, 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18 (2000)) (Celler-Kefauver Act).
63. PERITZ, supra note 5, at 195-99.
64. MICHAEL J. HOGAN, THE MARSHALL PLAN 2-3, 19 (1989).
65. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community arts. 85-86, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11.
66. PERITZ, supra note 5, at 107.
67. See, e.g., PERrrz, supra note 5, at 305-30.
68. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-16 (1962).
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manufacturer of trucks to impose territorial restraints on its dealers in
view of its likely demise at the hands of the more efficient Big-Three
(GM, Ford, Chrysler) 69 and outlawed a merger between two local super-
market chains in Los Angeles.70 The preference for small business is eco-
nomically irrational insofar as it denies the virtues of economies of
scale-whether for auto manufacturers, retailers, or banks. Indeed, as
economist Joseph Schumpeter wrote, it is large size that insulates firms
from the shocks of business cycles that destroy small firms in highly com-
petitive industries.71 They are simply too big and too stable to fail. At
least that was the economic logic at the time.
Two decisions in 1967 were even more economically irrational: In one,
the Court found that a small local bakery in Salt Lake City, Utah, had
suffered injury from the pricing policies of three large national bakeries
whose prices were not only lower locally than they were elsewhere, but
also below cost.72 That seems to be an unremarkable example of preda-
tory pricing until we learn that the small local bakery was doing the same
thing.73 Rather than viewing the market as reflecting fierce price compe-
tition, the Court expressed concern for the plight of the local, family-
owned business. As it turned out, the small firm went into bankruptcy
while the large firms continued in the market.7 4 But that's just price com-
petition, isn't it? In the second case, simply because Procter & Gamble
was twenty times larger than the entire household bleach industry, the
Court prohibited it from purchasing Clorox, the dominant bleach pro-
ducer, because it feared that Procter & Gamble would run rampant over
the industry by charging lower retail prices and destroying small compa-
nies that were doing fine. 75
During that extended episode of progressive delusions in the 1960s and
1970s, when it was thought that competition called for actual competitors,
we established the Neo-Classical Asylum for Economic Corrections at
the University of Chicago, with funding from several civic-minded corpo-
rate sponsors. New journals in law and economics were begun. Within a
few years, George Mason University developed summer retreats at beau-
tiful sea-side resorts to teach price theory economics to federal judges
and law professors. 76 The Olin Foundation funded law and economics
69. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 278-79 (1966).
70. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 259, 264 (1963).
71. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 106 (3d ed.
1950).
72. Utah Pie Co. v. Cont'l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 690 (1967).
73. See id. at 698-99.
74. Kathleen E. McDermott, Whatever Happened to... Utah Pie?, 8 ANTITRUST 42, 44
(1994).
75. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 573-75 (1967). The lower prices
were seen as resulting from lower advertising costs; production and distribution costs were
already low because scale economies were achieved rather quickly and markets were re-
gional. Id. at 571.
76. JOEL L. FLEISHMAN, J. SCOTT KOHLER & STEVE SCHINDLER, CASEBOOK FOR THE
FOUNDATION: A GREAT AMERICAN SECRET 150 (2007).
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institutes at Yale, Columbia, Stanford, and other prominent law schools. 77
Research institutes, including the American Enterprise and Cato Insti-
tutes, were moneyed and staffed.78
A new generation of law and economics scholarship was funded and
produced, all of it drilled in the neo-classical economics of price theory.
Allocative efficiency was the neutral principle underlying it all-alloca-
tive efficiency meaning wealth maximization. 79 Three prominent scholars
were Richard Posner, Robert Bork, and Ronald Coase. 80 Only Coase
was actually an economist. 81 Among their influential contributions, I
want to mention just a few. Posner mounted an ultimately unpersuasive
argument that wealth maximization was a proxy for Kantian personal au-
tonomy and, thus, for freedom of contract. 82 Along with other scholars
who declared the efficiency of the common law, Posner's claim revised
the diagnosis of Antitrust's bipolar disorder.83 This was a crucial moment.
The condition was found not to be bipolar after all because the conserva-
tive impulse toward freedom of contract was itself discovered to be be-
nign-a neutral principle that serves consumer welfare. Ronald Coase's
work was taken to corroborate this view insofar as the Coase Theorem
holds that parties will naturally bargain to the most efficient solution in
the absence of transaction costs. 84 Robert Bork, in his Antitrust Paradox,
expanded the scope of identity between consumer welfare and freedom
of contract by declaring that consumer welfare is a logical tautology that
is not subject to empirical investigation. 85 He concluded that, short of
price-fixing cartels, Antitrust should not restrain freedom of contract. 86
In consequence, Antitrust's condition was re-diagnosed as a delusional
disorder whose only disturbing symptom was the progressive extreme of
free competition. The conservative side turned out to be entirely ra-
tional: Consumer welfare and freedom from government intrusion were
consistent with one another and with the underlying norm of freedom of
contract.87 Coase had demonstrated that freedom of contract naturally
77. Id.
78. ERIC R. KINGSON & DIANE M. WATTs-RoY, THE GENERATIONAL EQUITY DE-
BATE 1980 (1999).
79. PERITZ, supra note 5, at 241, 243.
80. Id. at 236-38, 258-62.
81. Id. at 237.
82. See Richard A Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 103, 127, 134 (1979).
83. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm
in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 502 (1980). But see Duncan Ken-
nedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711,
713 (1980).
84. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960).
85. See generally Robert H. Bork, Judicial Precedents and the New Economics, in
CHANGING ANTITRUST STANDARDS: JUDICIAL PRECEDENT, MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBIL-
ITY, AND THE NEW ECONOMICS: ANTITRUST CONFERENCE 1983, at 10 (Betty Bock ed., The
Conference Board 1983) (stating that price theory is "entirely circular, which is its strength
because its circular logic is not rebuttable"); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARA-
DOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978).
86. See sources cited supra note 85.
87. PERITZ, supra note 5, at 187-95.
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produced efficient outcomes.88 At the same time, government was not
only oppressive per se but also economically inefficient for two inter-re-
lated reasons: First, regulators were out to maximize their own interests,
and not the public's.8 9 Second, regulated firms were in the best position
to take advantage of government regulators because they had more to
lose than disaggregated consumers or customers and, thus, the regulated
firms were willing to spend more to "buy" favorable regulation.90
When Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, he brought with him policy
makers who ascribed to these views of efficiency and freedom of contract.
At the Antitrust Division and the FTC, as well as the Securities & Ex-
change Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency, freedom
of contract became the policy of choice. 91
The difficulty, of course, was aligning laissez-faire economics with con-
gressional legislation that expressed other preferences. Indeed, Antitrust
legislation per se was a problem to the extent that it interfered with the
common law's natural tendency toward allocative efficiency in the ab-
sence of transaction costs because government regulation was seen as an
enormous transaction cost.
The Supreme Court, of course, could not simply ignore congressional
legislation. Fortunately, Congress had written the Antitrust Act in the
common law language of restraints of trade. And so the common law's
asserted tendency toward efficiency could be liberated from Antitrust's
delusional episodes of progressive jurisprudence. In a series of opinions,
the Court did just that. In light of the natural efficiency of contracts, the
Court's over-riding concern became what is called a Type I error-the
false positive finding of an Antitrust violation when the commercial con-
duct actually promoted allocative efficiency. 92 There was no concern
about false negatives because the underlying assumption was that free-
dom of contract served allocative efficiency. 93 This assumption, that
there are no false negatives, together with a second belief that markets
are contestable-that is, that there are no real barriers to entry in the
absence of government regulation-made it logical to formulate doctrine
that allowed the self-regulating price mechanism to perform its natural
functions. 94
Two decisions provide particularly good examples: In Matsushita Elec-
tric, the Court increased the plaintiff's burden of proving predatory pric-
ing.95 The Court viewed pricing below cost as presumptively irrational
because future recoupment of losses was seen as virtually impossible in
88. See Coase, supra note 84, at 15.
89. PERITZ, supra note 5, at 187.
90. PERITZ, supra note 5, at 189.
91. Id.
92. Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From
Separate Sphereses to Unified Field, 66 ANnTRUST L.J. 167, 198.
93. Id.
94. See PERITZ, supra note 5, at 282.
95. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 598-99 (1986).
2009]
SMU LAW REVIEW
light of the assumption that most markets had no barriers to entry and,
thus, firms could re-enter to charge lower prices as soon as the dominant
firm raised future prices to monopoly levels. 96 The Court affirmed this
view of markets as self-correcting in its 1993 Brooke Group decision,97
holding the plaintiff must prove the dangerous probability that a domi-
nant firm charging prices below cost would recoup its losses from future
earnings. No account was taken in either decision of the possibility that
economic rationality could identify goals other than direct short-term re-
coupment of losses from investment in below-cost pricing, particularly
goals as understood in the economics of game theory. 98
Still, even on this price-theory committed Supreme Court, there were
episodes of progressive relapse. For example, in 1985, the Court declared
that the dominant ski resort in Aspen, Colorado, could not terminate a
long-standing cooperation agreement with its competitor. 99 This decision
was widely understood as requiring a firm to deal with rivals when it pro-
vides an essential facility for competing in the market.100 In his subse-
quent Trinko opinion, Justice Scalia seemingly saw this understanding as
erroneous; indeed, Justice Scalia went a step further in declaring that
freedom of contract called for the narrowest of duties to deal in cases
involving a dominant firm.10' The analysis took up the nineteenth cen-
tury tenet of classical economics that more freedom of contract produces
more competition.
And so the Supreme Court has come full circle in recognizing freedom
of contract as the necessary pre-condition for allocative efficiency. Any-
thing else endangers the natural efficiency of markets that results from
self-regulation in light of the efficient common laws of contract and prop-
erty. The final point, then, is that the best Antitrust is the least, which, in
practical terms, reflects current U.S. policy: The tectonic shift to a rule of
reason has raised both the costs and the risks of private enforcement.
Moreover, the Antitrust Division and the FTC spend the bulk of their
resources approving mergers and pursuing price fixing cartels. 10 2 Both
agencies have spent few resources monitoring refusals to deal, vertical
restraints on distribution, tying and exclusive dealing, and consciously
96. Id. at 588-93.
97. Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224
(1993).
98. See Patrick Bolton, Joseph Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing:
Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L. REV. 2239, 2263 (2000). Game theory is the
dominant form of economics, despite the Supreme Court's reluctance to adopt it.
99. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
100. Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1211 (9th Cir.
1997); Bret Frishcman & Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75 Arn-
TRUST L.J. 1, 7 (2008).
101. It should be noted that Justice Scalia cited for authority United States v. Colgate &
Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), even though that Court stated explicitly that its freedom-of-con-
tract analysis would not be appropriate in a Sherman Act section 2 case like Trinko, 540
U.S. 398 (2004), involving a dominant firm.
102. Susan Creighton & Perry Narancic, Mergers and Acquisitions: Antitrust Issues in




parallel conduct-all of them strategic behavior that is particularly effec-
tive in an economy increasingly dependent on technological standards,
common platforms, and innovation protected by intellectual property
rights. 10 3
What is it you need to know about the delusional tendencies of our
fugitive Antitrust on the run? What would help in his capture and allow
you to take advantage of the natural efficiency of unregulated markets?
As an aside, let me say that European price theorists outside Great Brit-
ain have not fully embraced the economics of false-positive avoidance
and so cannot be trusted entirely.
That said, what do you need to know about the economic cure for An-
titrust's interventionist delusions?
1. Competition policy should concern itself only with economic effi-
ciency in the form of consumer welfare. This means maximizing
wealth by getting products and services to consumers who value
them the most. What that doesn't mean is having any concern about
who can afford them or how wealth might be transferred from con-
sumers to producers. That's distributive justice, fairness. That's
somebody else's job.
2. Market economics deals with markets and so industrial concentra-
tion more broadly is not our job. Nor is economic development.
3. We care about competition, not competitors. In fact, we can have
competition without any actual competitors because all markets are
contestable; potential entrants are all around us, flying under the ra-
dar or hiding under rocks. Markets are contestable except those
with barriers to entry imposed by government.
4. The rule of reason is concerned with the competitive effects of
restraining freedom of contract, with false positives not false nega-
tives. In short, markets do best when they are left alone. And we
should make absolutely sure something is wrong before we send An-
titrust in to muck things up. So we're not unhappy that the rule of
reason is so expensive and risky that it discourages private lawsuits
and limits public enforcement.
5. Finally, we believe that the exercise of intellectual property rights
is even more important than run-of-the-mill contract rights. Even
though we know they are barriers to entry imposed by government.
Even though they increase prices to consumers in the short run, not
to mention inventors in the long run. But we do have faith that intel-
lectual property rights create incentives for inventors in the long run
and so, consumers benefit even though our price theory analysis
can't deal with the long run or with the dynamics analysis that gets us
to the long run. And, we're trying to ignore the fact that incentive
theory has not been shown to constitute good public policy despite
over fifty years of effort by economists. It's been rejected even by
William Landes and Richard Posner at the Neo-Classical Asylum for
Economic Corrections. 10 4 So, we're going to stick to the short run
103. See id.
104. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 9 (2003).
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and worry about output and prices, and when we simply can't avoid
it, we're going to cross our fingers and leave the long run to incentive
theory as an expression of freedom of contract.
In sum, we know that commercial markets are self-regulating so long as
we keep an eye out for government regulation and naked price fixing
cartels, though we do have faith that cartels will fall of their own weight if
we just wait long enough. To the extent that the fugitive Antitrust claims
anything else, he is delusional and must be restrained. The best way to
restrain him is with a full-blown rule of reason analysis that discourages
government intervention into markets and keeps antitrust plaintiffs out of
court. Thanks for your help in this matter. And, keep the faith.
